Three heads of state from Africa’s Great Lakes region – Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Rwanda and Burundi – nicely settled into their positions of power, are all going through an awkward period.

Their terms in office are coming to an end and their countries’ constitutions bar them from standing again. Meanwhile, the silence, with regard to their real intentions and the identity of any potential successors, is absolute.

This ambiguity is fuelling political tensions, encouraging all kinds of speculation, and carries a strong risk of violence.

It is in Burundi that concerns are the strongest, following a report by the BINUB, the UN mission in Burundi, revealing that the ruling party, the CNDD-FDD (National Council for the Defence of Democracy - Forces for the Defence of Democracy), which has long been organising young members into sports clubs, has moved up a gear: the Imbonerakure are now emerging as a kind of paramilitary militia, spreading a climate of fear in rural areas and, even more worryingly, are allegedly being supplied with arms and uniforms.

Despite official denials, it is clear that the party hardliners, former rebels emerging from the armed struggle, have no intention of letting President Pierre Nkurunziza give up power without trying to impose a third term.

The first term was won in 2005 after the CNDD decided to give up the armed struggle, and the second was secured in 2010, after the opposition decided to boycott the election, arguing that it was rigged.

The pull to seek a third term in office is strongly contested by the opposition and the parliament has blocked it.

Some fear, as a result, that those holding the presidential majority will resort to violence and intimidation to persuade voters not to risk voting “the wrong way”.

In the capital city of Bujumbura, the political climate is increasingly tense: one of the country’s most respected human rights advocates, André Mbonimpa, was arrest in May, journalists are faced with repression, and concern is mounting.

The fear of interethnic clashes between Hutus and Tutsis has now given way to rivalries between Hutu parties.

Indeed, the peace agreements have eased ethnic tensions, by reserving guaranteed places for the minority Tutsi group. The Hutus may well be governing, but the Tutsis are represented at all political and military levels and are guaranteed a degree of security.

Other formations, by contrast, largely composed of Hutus, such as the FRODEBU (Front for Democracy in Burundi) and the FNL (National Liberation Front), consider President Nkurunziza’s formation to be acting increasingly like a single party, monopolising all the positions and the advantages of power.

Whilst opposition is strong in the capital, there is still wide support for the ruling party in rural areas.

The president is stepping up his visits to the country’s interior and has taken spectacular measures, including giving pregnant women free access to medical care and opening up access to primary education.

Uneasiness in Rwanda

Whilst in Burundi the pre-electoral tensions are on open display, in Rwanda, where President Paul Kagame’s second and, in principle, last term in office comes to an end in 2017, the subject is not on the agenda.

Or not officially, at least, as no one, in fact, is left indifferent.

A year back, assurances were given that Rwanda - a “model pupil” for some because of its fast economic development in the last twenty years - would respect the constitution and that the president would give way to a successor who has long been undergoing discreet preparation to take over from him. These assurances are no longer as firm.

The head of state, refusing to take a stand on the matter, has indicated that “if the people were to call on him” to do so, he could remain at the helm and has not excluded the possibility of amending the constitution.

It is true that there is a degree of uneasiness at the moment in Rwanda: better control of the border with Kivu has significantly reduced the flow of minerals being trafficked and, above all, Kigali is concerned by military movements that should, in principle, provide reassurance.

It would seem that former Hutu rebels, gathered within the FDLR (Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda), which have been in DRC since 1994, are giving up arms and gathering in transit centres before, in principle, being sent to other Congolese provinces, far from the border.

But Kigali remains suspicious, fearing a “dirty trick”, and is wary of MONUSCO (the United Nations Mission in Congo), and, above all, the African Intervention Brigade, composed of 3000 soldiers from Malawi, South Africa and Tanzania.

Relations are indeed very poor between Paul Kagame and his counterpart in Tanzania, Jakaya Kikwete, who is advocating an “inter-Rwandan dialogue”, meaning that the ruling Rwandan Patriotic Front, which has been in power for 20 years, would talk to those it still considers to be “genocidal”.

Furthermore, despite the opacity of the system, the RPF is nervous about the influence of the opposition in exile in South Africa, led by General Kayumba, former chief of staff, and Patrick Karegeya, former intelligence chief, who was murdered in a hotel in Pretoria on 31 December 2013.

Their party, the RNC (Rwandan National Congress), still has contacts inside Rwanda, as well as with the armed groups remaining in Congo.

In light of these uncertainties, many Rwandans think it unlikely that President Kagame will let go of the reins and, despite the country’s remarkable development, the fear of violence has not disappeared.

A third term for Kabila?

Discretion and repression in Burundi, worrying silence in Rwanda... Things could not be more different in Kinshasa, where the electoral calendar is the main topic of discussion.

The president of the Independent Election Commission, Apollinaire Malu Malu, has already announced the schedule for the upcoming local, provincial and senatorial elections.

These elections are important, as they are going to strengthen the base of the “democratic pyramid” and enable the emergence of a new political class.

They are also going to be very costly and require sophisticated material (there is even talk of transmitting the results by satellite to a central server in order to dispel any suspicion of fraud).

But potential donors have not yet announced any pledge of financial support for this exercise, estimated to cost a total of US$750 million.

Public opinion, both inside and outside DRC, is in fact focused on one thing only: will President Kabila stand for a third term or not?

To do so, the National Assembly would have to get rid of Article 220 of the constitution, which limits the number of terms in office to two.

Already, the international community’s ‘special envoys’, representing the members of the Security Council, have spoken out against any amendment of the constitution, and potential donors have stated that funds will only be released once the overall election calendar and a policy of ‘consensus’ have been established.

In other words, they are already challenging a manoeuvre that many suspect: the constitution will not be amended but the presidential election, to take place after all the others, will most likely be delayed.

President Joseph Kabila’s current term in office would then be extended for some time, for budgetary and organisational reasons.

This prospect alone is causing agitation among the opposition, whilst international pressure is causing visible irritation in Kinshasa: “Like everywhere else in the world, it is the independent election committee and it alone that will decide on the election calendar,” insisted Malu Malu before the press, while Prime Minister Matata Mponyo, who has to budget the cost of the next ballot, asserted during an interview that “the election is first and foremost the business of the Congolese and theirs alone...”.